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The focus of the present article is on sketching a psychopathology of the body in
schizophrenia and linking it to brain activity. This is done providing converging data
from psychopathological evidence (phenomenal), phenomenological contructs (trans-
phenomenal) and neuroscientific measures (pre-phenomenal). The phenomenal level
is the detailed documentation of the patients’ subjective anomalous experiences.
These phenomena are explicit contents in the patients’ field of consciousness. The
trans-phenomenal level targets the implicit yet operative matrix that underlies these
anomalous subjective experiences. Abnormal phenomena are viewed as expressions of
a modification of trans-phenomenal matrix, that is, in terms of an abnormal synthesis or
integration through time of intero-, proprio- and extero-ceptive stimuli. Finally, we link the
abnormalities of the trans-phenomenal matrix to pre-phenomenal alterations of the brain
resting state and of its spatio-temporal organization, as documented by neurobiological
methods providing spatial and temporal resolution of intrinsic brain activity (with many
features of the resting state remaining yet unclear though). Based on phenomenological
research, the body in schizophrenia is typically experienced in an itemized way as
an object external to one’s self and unrelated to events in the external world. Based
on neurobiological data, we tentatively hypothesize that such anomalies of the lived
body are related to decreased integration between intero-, extero- and proprioceptive
experiences by the brain’s spontaneous activity and its temporal structure. Taken all
together, this suggests that we view abnormalities of bodily experience in terms of their
underlying abnormal spatiotemporal features which, as we suppose, can be traced back
to the spatiotemporal features of the brain’s spontaneous activity.
Keywords: abnormal bodily phenomena, brain resting state, phenomenology, schizophrenia, spatio-temporal
psychopathology
INTRODUCTION
Psychopathological disorders are complex disturbances showing a wide variety of symptoms
that cover most brain functions, including sensorimotor, affective, cognitive, and social
functions. For instance, schizophrenic patients suffer from cognitive dysfunction (e.g., formal
thought disorders), affective changes (e.g., inadequate or diminished affective modulation),
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 172
Northoff and Stanghellini Spatiotemporal Psychopathology of the Lived Body
social withdrawal (e.g., lack of attunement, inability of
immersion in the world), and sensorimotor symptoms (e.g.,
catatonia).
Neuroimaging using techniques like functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) and Electroencephalogram (EEG)
have focused on extrinsic activity that concerns the brain’s
response to sensorimotor, cognitive, affective or social stimuli
or tasks, i.e., stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity. For
all the progress in investigating the brain’s extrinsic activity
and its various functions, diagnostic or therapeutic markers still
remain elusive. In its search for these specific markers, recent
neuroimaging in psychiatry has shifted to the brain’s intrinsic
activity, its so-called resting state activity.
Roughly, the brain’s intrinsic or resting state activity
describes the brain’s neural activity in the absence of any
specific tasks or stimuli (Logothetis et al., 2009). However,
the term ‘‘resting state’’ must be considered relative (rather
than absolute) since even in the absence of specific stimuli
or tasks, there is still plenty of processing going on. For
instance, the interoceptive stimuli from the own body like
the heart or the respiration continue to enter into the resting
state (Duncan and Northoff, 2013; Weinberger and Radulescu,
2016); these are usually filtered out in subsequent resting state
analyses but may nevertheless modify its ongoing dynamics
(Duncan and Northoff, 2013; Northoff, 2014a). Moreover,
there are plenty of cognitions in the form of task-unrelated
thoughts or mind wandering, going on in the resting state
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Taken into account these
(Weinberger and Radulescu, 2016, and others) different lines
of processing, the resting state cannot really be conceived a
proper rest in the literal form of the term. It may instead
be rather conceived a state where the neural processing is
directed more towards internal contents as related to the
own body and cognitions rather than the external contents
of the environment as when applying specific stimuli or
tasks (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011; Northoff, 2014a). When
we speak of “resting state” in the following, we presuppose
such more internally-directed state (as distinguished from a
more externally-directed state) rather than a “true” resting
state.
The brain’s resting state activity can spatially be characterized
by various neural networks consisting of regions showing
close ‘‘functional connectivity’’ yielding a particular spatial
structure (see below for details; methodological issues like
global signal regression in especially fMRI need to be considered
though; Weinberger and Radulescu, 2016; Duncan and Northoff,
2013). The same applies to the temporal domain, where
fluctuations in different frequency ranges are coupled with
each other, providing ‘‘neural synchrony’’ (Engel et al., 2013).
Neuroimaging reports a variety of changes in both functional
connectivity and neural synchrony in various psychiatric
disorders (that show low degrees of specificity and large
heterogeneity though; see Weinberger and Radulescu, 2016).
The exact meaning of these spatial and temporal abnormalities
in the resting state, if real and based on alterations in
physiological mechanisms, for psychiatric symptoms remains
unclear though.
Based on the spatiotemporal features of the resting state and
their alterations in psychiatric disorders, one of us (Northoff,
2015a,b) suggested a novel approach to psychopathology,
called ‘‘patiotemporal psychopathology’’. In a nutshell, such
spatiotemporal psychopathology conceives psychopathological
symptoms in spatiotemporal terms (of the resting state)
rather than in sensorimotor, affective, or cognitive terms
(as related to abnormal task-evoked or stimulus-induced
activity). Among others, such spatiotemporal approach
to psychopathological abnormal phenomena claims that
the spatiotemporal alterations of the resting state and its
internally-directed processing are manifest in abnormal
experience of time and space as well as of self, other
and body (Stanghellini, 2009; Stanghellini et al., 2014a,
2016).
The aim of this article is to apply this approach to
psychopathological abnormalities of the body in schizophrenia.
We conceive psychopathological symptoms of the body neither
in cognitive nor in sensorimotor (or affective) terms, but
trace them to abnormal spatial and temporal features of
the resting state and its internally-directed processing. The
first part of the article will briefly explain and sketch our
methodological approach namely how to link the brain’s resting
state to abnormal subjective experiences and psychopathological
symptoms. The second and third part will shed some detailed
light on the brain’s resting state activity and how its internally-
directed processing are related to time in general (second
part) and self/body in particular (third part). That provides
the ground for conceiving psychopathological abnormalities
of the body in schizophrenia in spatiotemporal terms (fourth
part of this article). Finally, a fifth part shall sketch some
implications of such approach. It shall be mentioned that,
due to space constraints, we will not be able to discuss
other approaches like the neurophenomenological approach
(Thompson, 2007; Fazelpour and Thompson, 2015) that also
aims to link brain and experience (in a slightly different way
though than the way we aim to do; see Appendix 1 in Northoff
(2014b) for discussing the neurophenomenological approach
as distinguished from a neurophenomenal approach as also
suggested here).
METHOD—SPATIOTEMPORAL
APPROACH TO BRAIN AND EXPERIENCE
Bottom-Up Approach: From the Brain’s
Spontaneous Activity Over its
Pre-phenomenal Features to the
Phenomenal Features of Experience
Methodologically, spatiotemporal psychopathology includes two
central features: first, the investigation of the patients’ brain
and its spontaneous or resting state activity in terms of the
spatiotemporal features of its internally-directed processing, and
secondly, the investigation of the patients’ subjective experience
of themselves and the world in predominantly spatiotemporal
terms such that it can be linked directly to the former. While
the first is done in neuroscience (Northoff, 2014a,b, 2015a,b),
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the second requires a phenomenological approach (Stanghellini
and Rossi, 2014). At first glance one may be puzzled to combine
phenomenological investigation of subjective experience with
neuroscientific characterization of the resting state since both
cover different and seemingly mutually exclusive domains:
neuronal activity, e.g., brain, and subjective experience, e.g.,
selfhood and personhood. In order to make direct link
between the subjective experiences’ phenomenal features and
the resting state’s internally-directed processing possible, we
need to reveal some features that commonly underlie both,
are shared, and can therefore provide the hitherto missing
link. We assume that these commonly shared and underlying
features are spatiotemporal features that structure and organize
both the brain’s resting state and the person’s subjective
experience.
The investigation of spatiotemporal features in the brain’s
resting state can be done in more or less a direct way by
investigating spatial variables like functional connectivity
within and between regions/networks and temporal measures
as frequency fluctuations and variability (Fox et al., 2005;
Deco et al., 2013; Cabral et al., 2014; Northoff, 2014a,b,
2015a,b; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015; we need to take
into account several not yet fully resolved methodological
issues like heart and respiration rate control and global
signal regression; Duncan and Northoff, 2013; Weinberger
and Radulescu, 2016). We assume that the resting state’s
internally-directed processing and its spatiotemporal
features predispose the various features of subjective
experiences of self, body and taken in this sense, the resting
state’s internally-directed processing and its spatiotemporal
features are not merely neuronal but rather ‘‘pre-phenomenal’’
with the prefix ‘‘pre’’ indicating that they predispose the
transformation of the brain’s merely neuronal activity into
the phenomenal features of subjective experience. Without
getting into detail here, we characterize ‘‘phenomenal’’
in terms of various features that are supposed to signify
experience or consciousness; these include intentionality,
self-perspectival organization, unity, temporal continuity,
and qualia (among others; for details, see Van Gluick (2014)
in Stanford Encyclopedia as well as Northoff (2014b) for
details).
This can be referred to as ‘‘bottom up approach’’: from
the brain’s spontaneous activity (bottom) to experience, i.e.,
consciousness (top). The brain’s spontaneous activity and the
spatiotemporal structure of its internally-directed processing
predispose experience and can therefore be methodologically
described as being pre-phenomenal. That though raises the
questions: how does exactly the spatiotemporal structure
characterize phenomenal experience, and which spatiotemporal
structure surfaces in experience?
Top-Down Approach: From Experience
Over its Trans-Phenomenal Features to the
Brain’s Spontaneous Activity
In order to address this question, we methodologically need
first to investigate experience itself and reveal its underlying
spatiotemporal structure. Methodologically, this requires the
opposite approach: rather than moving bottom-up from the
brain’s spontaneous activity to spatiotemporal structure (and
from there to experience), we now need to move top-down
from to its (underlying) spatiotemporal structure. Starting from
experience, the top-down approach may then conjoint with the
bottom-up approach in the spatiotemporal structure as shared
and converging point between experience and brain.
This raises the following question: how do we investigate
and reveal the spatiotemporal features of a person’s
subjective experience? In a nutshell, this method, namely
phenomenological investigation, entails a two-step procedure
that reveals the phenomenal and trans-phenomenal features of
experience.
The first—called phenomenal exploration—is the gathering
of qualitative descriptions of a person’s lived experiences.
For instance, a patient may describe his thoughts as alien
(‘‘Thoughts are intruding into my head’’) and the world
surrounding him as fragmented (‘‘The world is a series of
snapshots’’). The result is a rich and detailed collection of the
patients’ self-descriptions (Stanghellini and Rossi, 2014). In this
way, we detect the critical points where the constitution of
experience is vulnerable and open to derailments reflecting the
‘‘phenomenal features’’ of patients’ subjective experiences of
specific contents, e.g., objects and events in themselves and the
world. In short, phenomenal exploration as first step focuses
on contents; experience is considered here in a content-based
way.
The second step aims to shift to phenomenology proper in
that it seeks the underlying or basic structures or existential
dimensions of the life-worlds patients live in. Abnormal
phenomena are here viewed as the outcome of a profound
modification of human subjectivity within the world.
Phenomenology is committed to attempting to discover
the common source that ties the seemingly heterogeneous
individual experiences or phenomena related to contents
together thus targeting its underlying constitutive structures,
namely spatiotemporal structures. These structures are not
directly experienced by the person. We call these features
trans-phenomenal, rather than merely ‘‘phenomenal’’.
Historically, the prefix ‘‘trans’’ in ‘‘trans-phenomenal’’ alludes
to the concept of ‘‘transcendental’’ as originating in philosophy.
Kant used this concept to denote those conditions that are
necessary for making something possible without being sufficient
for its actual realization and manifestation.
The concept of ‘‘trans-phenomenal’’ targets those features
that underlie and even more important, constitute subjective
experience prior to and independent of the contents, e.g.,
events and objects. Taken in this way, the ‘‘trans-phenomenal
features’’ concern those spatial and temporal features that
structure and constitute the subject’s experience of self,
body and objects and events in the world. This second
step of phenomenological analysis, then, aims to recover the
underlying spatiotemporal structures, the trans-phenomenal
features that usually recede into the background and remain
implicit yet operative in our subjective self- and world-
experience.
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Any phenomenon is viewed as the expression of a given
form of trans-phenomenal matrix. Abnormal phenomena are
the outcome of a profound modification of this matrix—that is,
the transcendental (non experienced) structure that gives form
to experience. For example, in schizophrenia, the person may
lose its anchoring in the lived body as a Gestalt of organs and
functions delimited from the external environment (Narayanan
et al., 2014), or in temporal continuity (Sun et al., 2013a), or in
anisotropic space, meaning space that is imbued with a point
of view (Uhlhaas et al., 2006), or in intersubjective attunement
and common sense (Uhlhaas and Singer, 2012), or in selfhood
(Ranlund et al., 2014; for review, see Moran and Hong, 2011; Sass
and Pienkos, 2013; Mancini et al., 2014).
We postulate that the trans-phenomenal features refer to
spatiotemporal features since they constitute and construct
the background of the contents of experience and of the
life-world. Thereby the spatiotemporal features remain
most often tacitly or implicitly in the background of our
experience that is dominated by its contents where they
nevertheless structure and organize the latter (see below for
details). Our top-down approach thus proceeds from the
contents of phenomenal experience to its underlying tacit or
implicit trans-phenomenal background which is constitutive
of experience itself. The trans-phenomenal background itself
is outside of what Markovà and Berrios (2015) consider a
‘‘psychiatric object’’ amenable to direct psychopathological
analyses. None the less, its characteristics can be deduced
from careful assessement and measures conducted on the
phenomenal level (for details, see Stanghellini and Ballerini,
2008).
Convergence Between Bottom-Up and
Top-Down Approaches: Correspondence
or Convergence Between Pre- and
Trans-Phenomenal Features
Can we link and converge the ‘‘trans-phenomenal features’’
of experience to the ‘‘pre-phenomenal features’’ of the
brain’s spontaneous activity? As indicated both ‘‘pre-
phenomenal’’ and ‘‘trans-phenomenal’’ features both concern
spatiotemporal features: the ‘‘pre-phenomenal features’’ are
those spatiotemporal features of the brain’s resting state that
are investigated via biological methods, whereas the ‘‘trans-
phenomenal’’ features are the same events investigated via
phenomenological methods. We may assume that they are
(or refer to) the same event detected and thus described in
different terms (neurobiological vs. phenomenological). We
suggest that whenever we find a given form of spatiotemporal
pattern on the pre-phenomenal level (the brain’s spontaneous
activity) this will consistently converge and match with
a corresponding spatiotemporal pattern on the trans-
phenomenal level. The pre- and trans-phenomenal underpin
phenomenal features and thus experience, and predispose
and constitute subjective experience of ourselves and the
world. Due to their predisposing character, alterations
in the resting state’s pre-phenomenal internally-directed
processing with its spatiotemporal features may translate
(in a more or less direct way) into corresponding changes in
the subjective experience of space, time, body, self, others,
etc.
Let us put our hypothesis into a more succinct philosophical
way. The ‘‘trans-phenomenal‘‘ and the ‘‘pre-phenomenal’’
are not two distinct levels of the living organism. They are
just methodologically distinct. This means that to access,
measure and describe these two levels we need distinct
methods, e.g., bottom-up neuro-biological and top-down
phenomenological approaches as described above. Note also
that our claim is more empirical than ontological and taken
within the empirical domain when we postulate (empirical)
convergence or correspondence between the spatiotemporal
features on the trans-phenomenal and the neuro-biological
level. Such claim for empirical correspondence or convergence
between trans-phenomenal and neuronal (or better neuro-
spatiotemporal) levels does not necessarily imply their
ontological identity we ‘‘pre-phenomenal’’ level of the
brain and its spontaneous activity (with its internally-
directed processing) and the ‘‘trans-phenomenal’’ level
underlying experience by using distinct measures (see
Figure 1).
Let us rephrase such spatiotemporal approach to
psychopathological symptoms with regard to the concepts
of the pre- and trans-phenomenal features. We suggest that
these spatiotemporal abnormalities are manifest in the patients’
abnormal subjective self- and world-experience and in their
respectively underlying spatiotemporal structure, the trans-
phenomenal features. The latter in turn may be predisposed
in the brain’s resting state and its spatiotemporal features, the
pre-phenomenal features. Accordingly, we assume direct linkage
from the resting state and its internally-directed processing’s pre-
phenomenal spatiotemporal features over the trans-phenomenal
FIGURE 1 | Pre- and Trans-phenomenal features in brain and
experience.
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spatiotemporal features, to abnormal spatiotemporal structuring
of cognitive, affective social and sensorimotor functions as
these are manifest on the phenomenal level in the various
psychopathological symptoms. This shall be illustrated, specified
and exemplified in the following by the example of bodily
symptoms in schizophrenia.
It is important to note once more that our approach
is not confined to the contents of experience. It considers
abnormal contents as endpoints while focusing on their
underlying construction and constitution: the contents
are supposed to emerge from an abnormal underlying
spatiotemporal structure, e.g., the trans-phenomenal features,
which in turn are constituted in this way by abnormalities
in the spontaneous activity’s pre-phenomenal features,
i.e., its spatiotemporal structure. The focus on structure
rather than the contents of experience distinguishes our
approach from alternative hypotheseis like standard cognitive
approaches (Halligan and David, 2001). There the focus on
contents, and on the way these contents are associated (e.g.,
integration of information) by means of cognitive functions,
predominates.
BRAIN, TIME AND EXPERIENCE OF THE
LIVED BODY
From Brain to Time: Operational Measures
and the Spatiotemporal Structure of the
Brain’s Spontaneous Activity
One should be aware that the concept of the brain’s intrinsic
or resting state activity is a rather heterogeneous one and raises
several methodological questions (see alsoMorcom and Fletcher,
2007a,b; Deco et al., 2013; Duncan and Northoff, 2013; Ganzetti
and Mantini, 2013; Northoff, 2014a; Weinberger and Radulescu,
2016). Besides resting state activity, other terms like baseline,
spontaneous activity or intrinsic activity are also used to describe
the internally generated activity in the brain (see Deco et al.,
2013; Ganzetti and Mantini, 2013; Northoff, 2014a). Even more
important, the exact relationship between resting state activity
and stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity remains unclear
with some authors assuming mere additive interaction (Fox
et al., 2005) while others presume non-linear interaction (He,
2013 Huang et al. 2015). This makes the distinction between
resting state and stimulus-induced activity rather blurry so
that we conceive both in relative rather than absolute terms.
The terms resting state and stimulus-induced activity index
extremes on a balance between internally- and externally-
directed processing with a mixture of both being the ‘‘normal’’
case.
Resting state activity can be measured in different ways:
metabolic investigations using positron emission tomography
(PET) focus on measuring quantitatively the brain’s energetic
metabolism indicating the resting state’s utilization and
distribution of for instance glucose (Shulman et al., 2014). In
contrast, fMRI as relying on the blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) effects as a neuro-vascular (rather than metabolic)
signal targets different resting state’s neural networks as based
on statistical, i.e., correlative relationships between different
regions’ voxel signifying functional connectivity (Raichle
et al., 2001; Menon, 2011; Cabral et al., 2014; which may also
depend on some methodological specifics such as global signal
regression Saad et al., 2012; Gotts et al., 2013). Resting state
activity can also concern electrophysiological or magnetic
activity as measured with EEG or magnetoencephalography
(MEG; Deco et al., 2013; Ganzetti and Mantini, 2013) that
targets neural activity changes in different frequency ranges.
Finally, one may also measure the resting state activity in
psychological terms as for instance by the degree of mind
wandering or spontaneous/random thoughts (Kam et al.,
2013).
The different measures of resting state activity may be
characterized as spatial, temporal or spatiotemporal. PET, for
instance provides spatial resolution while basically showing
no temporal resolution. The focus is on spatial resolution in
fMRI too though functional connectivity is based on calculating
time series of voxel thus introducing a temporal component.
EEG/MEG show excellent temporal resolution but low spatial
resolution. This makes clear-cut segregation of spatial and
temporal features in resting state activity impossible entailing its
integrated spatiotemporal nature.
One may want to contest that the resting state’s integrated
spatiotemporal nature makes the assumption that its
abnormalities are spatiotemporal almost trivially true. Resting
state abnormalities are by the very nature of brain activity which
is by default spatiotemporal. That is certainly true. However,
the various investigations demonstrated that the resting state’s
internally directed processing and its spatiotemporal features
are rather dynamic and thus subject to continuous change.
The resting state’s internally-directed processing continuously
construct spatiotemporal features which differ from moment
to moment dynamically over time. When speaking of the
term ‘‘spatiotemporal’’ we mean such ongoing and continuous
dynamic changes in internally-directed processing with the
continuous construction of novel spatiotemporal features at each
moment in time. Briefly, the term ‘‘spatiotemporal’’ is meant in
a dynamic rather than static way.
Even more important, the central point in this article is
not about the resting state itself and its internally-directed
processing but rather about how its continuous dynamic
construction of spatiotemporal features is altered in psychiatric
disorders and translates into psychopathological symptoms: the
abnormal spatiotemporal nature of the brain’s resting state
and its internally-directed processing is supposed to directly
translate into corresponding spatiotemporal abnormalities that
underlie and account for psychopathological symptoms. Distinct
spatiotemporal alterations in the resting state’s internally-
directed processing may then be assumed to lead to distinct
psychopathological symptoms.
Generally, this provides a novel perspective on
psychopathological symptoms, i.e., an internally-directed resting
state-based spatiotemporal perspective that complements
current more externally-directed task-evoked-based
sensorimotor, affective, cognitive, or social approaches
(Northoff, 2015a,b). This means that psychopathological
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symptoms can be accounted for in terms of the spatial and
temporal features of the brain’s resting state and its continuous
internally-directed processing.
From Brain Over Time to the Body:
Integration of the Body’s Intero- and
Proprioceptive Input within the Resting
State’s Spatiotemporal Structure
The resting state is determined as the spontaneous activity of
the brain and its internally-directed processing that remains
independent of specific externally-directed processing and the
respective external stimulus input. That though implies that there
is still plenty of unspecific stimulus input from outside the brain
into its resting state. This concerns exteroceptive stimuli from
at least four senses which even during sleep provide continuous
and unspecific input. The same applies to the body. The body is
always there and provides continuous intero- and proprioceptive
input into the brain and its resting state (see Figure 2).
How can we empirically support the assumption of the
continuous intero- and proprioceptive input into our brain’s
resting state? One would for instance expect direct correlation
between the interoceptive input from the heart and resting
state activity in corresponding regions. This has indeed been
shown in a recent study. Chang et al. (2013) demonstrated
the degree of heart rate variability directly impacted the
degree of functional connectivity, i.e., its variability in
the brain’s resting state activity. Especially the functional
connectivity of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the
amygdala with subcortical regions in the brain stem, the
thalamus and putamen was modulated by the degree of heart
variability.
Accordingly, heart rate variability, exerts direct impact on
the brain’s resting state, i.e., the variability or dynamics of its
functional connectivity in those regions, i.e., subcortical and
their relation to cortical ones, that show strong interoceptive
input. One may even want to go further and postulate that
the temporal structure of the heart’s interoceptive input may
FIGURE 2 | (A) Relationship between interoceptive stimulus processing and experience of lived body. (B) Relationship between interoceptive stimulus processing
and itemization and dynamization of the (lived) body in experience.
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be related to and be encoded into the temporal structure
of the brain’s intrinsic activity and its internally-directed
processing (see for instance (Northoff, 2014a) for further
details of such encoding of what can be called ‘‘vegetative
statistics’’). That though remains to be shown in future
studies.
How do these findings and suggestions stand in relation
to experience and psychopathology of the body? The
interaction of the intero- and proprioceptive input from
the body into the brain’s resting state activity entails that
these inputs are set and integrated within the ongoing spatial
and temporal dynamics, i.e., structure of the resting state.
They are integrated and encoded within the resting state’s
internally-directed processing and its functional connectivity (as
shown above) and possibly also into its ongoing frequency
fluctuations (as it remains to be demonstrated). More
generally, this means that the incoming input from the
body, intero- and proprioceptive, becomes integrated within
a larger spatiotemporal framework of the resting state’s
internally-directed processing.
How can we further support the assumption of such
spatiotemporalization of the body’s intero- and proprioceptive
input? This can indeed be supported on phenomenological
grounds.
From Experience to Time:
“Trans-Phenomenal Temporality”
We assume that the resting-state brain activity predisposes
in a pre-phenomenal way what we will call in the following
transcendental temporality (TT) as specific ‘‘trans-phenomenal
feature’’.
The general hypothesis is that the integrity of TT is the
background and condition of possibility for the integrity of the
experience of time, space, body, self, and all the other dimensions
of the life world. In this paragraph, we provide some introductory
remarks about the concepts of lived time and TT.
We must distinguish two levels of analysis of temporality:
the phenomenal and the trans-phenomenal one. On the first
level we find the abnormalities of time experience. We refer
to this feature of temporality with the term ‘‘phenomenal’’ or
‘‘lived’’ time. We may experience lived time as fast or slow,
continuous or discontinuous, future- or past-directed, etc. The
second level of temporality is pre-thematic, in the sense that we
are not directed to it and as such it remains in the background
of our phenomenal experience. It is pre-reflectively present. It
‘‘functions’’ implicitly and automatically. It is passive in the
sense that it produces associative connections prior to any
active engagement and is involuntary since it does not involve
‘‘higher’’ voluntary level. We refer to it with the term TT. TT
underlies and constitutes any given phenomenal experience for
which reason we speak of ‘‘transcendental’’ temporality. It is
the temporal infrastructure of all experience. It has its lawful,
fundamental regularity as a mode of genesis and constitution of
experience.
The integrity of TT is the condition of possibility of the
identity through time of an object of perception as well as of the
person who perceives it. Our experience of the permanence in
time of a given object whose aspects cannot exist simultaneously
but only appear across time (e.g., a melody, or a tridimensional
object seen from different perspectives) would be impossible
if our consciousness were only aware of what is given in a
punctual ‘‘now’’. We can perceive an object as a unitary and
identical object because our consciousness is not caught in
the ‘‘now’’, but the now-moment has a ‘‘width’’ that extends
toward the recollection of past and the expectation of the
future.
Time consciousness has a threefold intentional structure:
primal impressions are articulated with the retention of the
just-elapsed and the protention or anticipation of the just-
about-to-occur. Also, the feel we have of ourselves as unitary
subjects of experience remaining permanent through time is
due to the integrity of TT. If we have the feel of our mental
life as a streaming self-awareness this is a consequence of
the continuity of inner time consciousness as the innermost
structure of our acts of perception. Thanks to the unified,
pre-reflexive (that is, implicit and tacit), operation of primal
impression, protention and retention underlying our experience
of the present our consciousness is internally related to itself and
self-affecting.
Such temporal structure characterized by primal impression,
protention and retention is not phenomenal since it is not
experienced as such. Instead, distinguishing it from the merely
phenomenal ‘‘lived time’’ (that is, time as it is experienced by
the subject), such temporal structure, i.e., TT, is rather a ‘‘trans-
phenomenal feature’’ that underlies and constitutes any given
phenomenal experience. TT is per se unexperienced, thus lies
on the trans-phenomenal level rather than the phenomenal as
lived time. The characteristics of time experience, i.e., lived
time, are simply one of the phenomenal consequences of
the integrity or of the disruption of the TT. A fundamental
consequence of the temporal structure provided by the integrity
of TT is that we do not have partial views of ourselves
and of the world, or mere isolated snapshots, or two-
dimensional figures or representations, because each item of
our experience is constantly integrated into a continuum
which connects the present moment’s ‘‘adumbration’’ with
retention (what we already know or have just perceived of
that, or a similar, object) and protention (what we expect
or imagine it to be). An ‘‘intentional arc’’ in consciousness
bridges the retained past with the anticipated future, and thus
makes possible our ‘‘milieu humain’’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962,
p. 158).
Conscious experience at any moment stretches from the
here-and-now backwards to the past and towards the future.
This function provides consciousness of the temporal horizon
of the present object. No experience and no coherence of
consciousness is possible without the temporal constitution
of ‘‘primal presentational, retentional and protentional
intentions [urimpressionalen, retentionalen und protentionalen
Intentionen]’’ (Husserl, 2001, p. 233). As we have seen, there are,
at least, two levels in the temporal structure of our experience:
the phenomenal level, that is, the thematic articulations in
the form of our active recollection and expectation, memory
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and imagination. And the trans-phenomenal one, that is,
the implicit, pre-conceptual structuring in the form of the
passive synthesis of retention and protention that we called
TT. In Husserl’s terms, the constitution or construction of
the structure of time is the outcome of a passive synthesis.
Taken within our framework, ‘‘passive synthesis’’ may then
refer to those features which we described as ‘‘trans-temporal
features’’. In the first place, passive synthesis occurs in the
constitution of the basic temporal field in which all experience
occurs. According to Husserl (2001), the basic temporal unit
is not a ‘‘knife-edge’’ present, but a ‘‘duration-block’’. It is
a ‘‘constitutive flux’’ that that has a threefold structure. As
we have seen, this temporal field is a dynamic structure that
comprises the primal presentation of the now-phase articulated
with the retention of the just-elapsed and the protention
or anticipation of the just-about-to-occur. The structure of
TT is the integration of protention-primal presentation-
retention. The temporal flow of consciousness retains and
protends itself and is in this way is self-unifying or, so to say,
‘‘self-synthesizing’’.
We associate the term ‘‘passive synthesis’’ with the
constitution of experience. This is in accordance with
the fact that we postulate passive synthesis to constitute the
trans-phenomenal features of experience. We argue that the
trans-phenomenal features of experience correspond the
pre-phenomenal features of the brain’s spontaneous activity.
This means that the concept of passive synthesis may then
also be considered within the context of the brain and thus
within a neuronal rather than exclusively phenomenological
context. We therefore distinguish a narrow and wide meaning
of the term ‘‘passive synthesis’’: the narrow meaning uses this
term in an exclusively phenomenological context. The wide
meaning, in contrast, extends and enlarges the concept of
passive synthesis to indicate the constitution and construction
of spatiotemporal features on the middle level between
brain and experience, where the brain’s pre-phenomenal
features converge with the experience’s trans-phenomenal
features.
Synthesis’ means that something is put and linked together.
We saw above that interoceptive stimuli from the body and
exteroceptive stimuli from the world are linked and (knitted
together in the brain’s resting state). Most importantly, this
also means that the different time scales of the respective
stimuli (including both internal, (or interoceptive) and
external (or exteroceptive) are linked together. For instance,
the 1 s scale of the interoceptive stimuli from the heart
(as reflecting the delta frequency range) are integrated
with the longer time scales of for instance our view of
an elephant moving by (which may last around 10–20 s
thus covering the infraslow range like slow four). These
different time scales of intero- and exterocepetive stimuli
are now linked and integrated within the brain’s resting
state activity which leads to the construction or synthesis
of a particular temporal structure. One may consequently
want to characterize the brain’s resting state by synthesis of
different time scales. Based on empirical data, we assume
that such construction of different time scales by the
brain’s resting state and its different frequency fluctuations
predisposes the synthesis of the threefold temporal structure
as described by Husserl (2001; for details, see Northoff,
2014b).
The synthesis is not subject to active construction and
determination by the person himself. In other terms, the
synthesis is not voluntary (and non-automatic) but involuntary
(and automatic) occurring by default. This is exactly the case
in the brain’s resting state and its continuous construction
of time during internally-directed processing: it occurs in an
automatic way by default and therefore does not underlie our
active and voluntary (usually cognitive) control. Hence, the
resting state’s continuous construction of time and temporal
structure during its internally-directed processing can indeed
by described as passive and synthetic (see chapters 13–15
and Appendix 2 in Northoff, 2014b for details as well as
Northoff, 2015a). Taken in this sense, the notion of passive
indicates that such synthesis occurs by default, e.g., in automatic
way.
Passive Synthesis and Body: From Passive
Synthesis of Time to the Experience of
Lived Body
We so far tried to demonstrate how the brain’s spontaneous
activity and its internally-directed processing constructs a
specific temporal structure within which the intero- and
proprioceptive stimuli from the body are passively synthesized.
We then went on to show the transcendental structure
of experience and characterized its underlying construction
processes by the concept of ‘‘passive synthesis’’. This leaves now
open the final step how such passive construction or synthesis of
a temporal structure in both spontaneous activity and experience
leads to the experience of the body as lived body. This is the focus
in this section.
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, phenomenology
has developed a distinction between lived body (Leib) and
physical body (Koerper), or body-subject and body-object. The
first is the body experienced from within, my own direct
experience of my body in the first-person perspective, myself
as a spatiotemporal embodied agent in the world, the second is
the body thematically investigated from without, as for example
by natural sciences as anatomy and physiology, a third person
perspective. Phenomenology conceives of the lived body as
the center of the experience of my self, and especially of the
most primitive form of self-awareness, as the perspectival origin
of my experiences (i.e., perceptions or emotions), actions and
thoughts. The lived body has also the power of organizing
experience.
Husserl (1912–1915) showed that amodification in one’s lived
body implies a modification in the perception of the external
world: ‘‘The shape of material things as aistheta, just as they stand
in front of me in an intuitive way, depends on my configuration,
on the configuration of the experiencing subject, refers to my
own body’’. By means of the integrity of kinaesthesia—the sense
of the position and movement of voluntary muscles—my own
body is the constant reference of my orientation in the perceptive
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field. The perceived object gives itself through the integration of
a series of prospective appearances.
The lived body is not only the perspectival origin of my
perceptions and the locus of their integration, it is the means by
which I own the world, insomuch as it structures and organizes
the chances of participating in the field of experience. The
living body perceives worldly objects as parts of a situation in
which it is engaged, of a project to which it is committed, so
that its actions are responses to situations rather than reactions
to stimuli. Last but not least, the lived body is also at the
center of intersubjectivity if we understand intersubjectivity as
intercorporeality, i.e., the immediate, pre-reflexive perceptual
linkage between my own and the other’s body through which I
recognize another being as an alter ego and make sense of her
actions (Stanghellini, 2009).
How now can we link the experience of the body as lived
body to the brain and its spatiotemporal structure during
internally-directed processing? Based on the above sections,
this leads to postulate what can be described as the ‘‘temporal
hypothesis of the lived body’’. We tentatively postulate that
the difference between objective vs. lived body in experience
is closely related to the resting state’s spatiotemporal features
during internally-directed processing: the better the body’s
intero- and proprioceptive input is integrated into the resting
state’s ongoing temporal structure during its internally-directed
processing, the higher the degree of subjective experience
of the body as ‘‘lived body’’ as distinguished from the
experience of a merely ‘‘objective body’’. Though awaiting
empirical support, this can be well tested experimentally in
the future by combining temporal measures of the neuronal
processing of interoceptive stimuli (like measuring variability
in different frequency fluctuations of the brain’s spontaneous
activity and how that relates to the timing of the interoceptive
stimuli from for instance heart beat or respiration rate)
and temporal measures for the subjective experience of the
body.
Specifically, we hypothesize that the temporal dimensions
in our experience of the lived body as for instance the
subjectively experienced durations of the experience of the body
in first-person perspective (as distinguished from the objective
observation of the body in third-person perspective) may
correspond to the duration of the predominant frequency
fluctuations into which the body’s intero- and proprioceptive
input is integrated during specifically the resting state and
its internally-directed activity: the lower and stronger the
brain’s frequency fluctuations that primarily integrates the body’s
proprio- and interoceptive input, the longer the periods of
first-person perspectival experience of the own body as lived
body.
In the following, we will focus on the temporal underpinnings
of our experience of the lived body. This is to neglect many other
relevant dimensions like the spatial and subjective dimensions:
the body as lived body is not only about time but also space.
Moreover, we leave out the question: ‘‘how and why is it possible
for us to experience our body as lived body at all?’’ Finally, we did
not touch upon the subjective character of the body as our own
body and thus in a self-related way. The discussion of these issues
is beyond the scope of this article though and has been detailed
elsewhere (Northoff, 2014b).
ABNORMALITIES IN EXPERIENCE OF
TIME AND LIVED BODY IN
SCHIZOPHRENIA
How about psychopathological abnormalities in the experience
of the lived body? Our ‘‘temporal hypothesis of the lived
body’’ points out that alterations can occur at different levels.
Either the changes can occur primarily at the level of the body
which then sends abnormal intero- and proprioceptive input
to the brain and its spontaneous activity; this may be the case
in various medical disorders like heart disease that often go
along with strong psychological symptoms like anxiety. Or,
alternatively, the primary abnormality may lie in the brain itself
whose spontaneous activity may construct an abnormal temporal
structure which renders the subsequent integration of the body’s
intero- and proprioceptive stimuli also abnormal. This, as we
will demonstrate in the following, seems to be the case in
schizophrenia.
For that purpose, we first pursue a top-down approach of
the experiential abnormalities in schizophrenia with regard to
the lived body. We first sketch abnormal experience of the lived
body in schizophrenia which will be accompanied by discussing
abnormal experience of time in these patients. That in turn
serves to account for the abnormal experience of the lived
body in terms of an abnormal underlying temporal structure
reflecting what we described above as trans-temporal features.
Such temporal top-down approach to the experience of the
lived body will then be complemented by a bottom-up approach
from the brain’s spontaneous activity and its pre-phenomenal
abnormalities.
Abnormal Experience of the Lived Body
In general, persons with schizophrenia experience throughout
the course of their illness that the body loses its ambivalent
status of being both an anonymous, physical object (a body
as an object among other objects) and an integral part of our
subjective experience (a personal body or lived body). The ‘‘vital’’
or ‘‘organic’’ part of embodiment becomes objectified: ‘‘I am
provided with an anal expeller’’, ‘‘arms are just prostheses’’,
‘‘hands disjointed from arms’’, ‘‘[I am] a bionic creature’’,
‘‘a second body growing inside me’’, ‘‘eyes are videocameras’’,
‘‘instincts directed by electrodes’’.
As the body transforms into a deanimated object, the self
loses its otherwise inescapable connection to the body, it becomes
a purely spiritual person, that is, a person with only mental,
intellectual dimensions who considers herself as having (not
being) a body, possessing it, and accordingly having complete
voluntary control over this animal part of her being: ‘‘like
a cybernaut in my body’’, ‘‘push button to activate brain’’,
‘‘supervisor of my animal body’’, ‘‘all these hairs . . . animal
body’’, ‘‘[in my body] like an emperor in his pyramid’’,
‘‘supernatural powers’’.
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There are twomain properties of abnormal bodily experiences
in schizophrenia: dynamization of bodily boundaries and
construction, and morbid objectivization/devitalization
(Stanghellini et al., 2012, 2014a,b; Madeira et al., 2016).
Dynamization
Patients complain about their body being violated by entities or
forces coming from without their own bodily boundaries, e.g.,
about the intrusion or incorporation of extrapersonal things,
forces, and events. This is a perplexing metamorphosis in
one’s corporeal borders and Gestalt. Violation typically entails
dynamism in the sense of experiencing something moving into
oneself, not merely the static presence in oneself of something
that should occupy a position external to the self. Patients
also experience a dynamization of bodily construction. This is
an experience of body disintegration which involves a shifting
around of the usual spatial relationships between body parts,
or a dynamic distortion of body Gestalt, i.e., of one’s body
as a unitary and integrated structure. Parts of the body are
felt as moving away from their usual position. Their body
structure is being disintegrated and bodily parts are itemized (i.e.,
disaggregation of bodily parts or dissolution/loss of coherence of
bodily structure).
A third aspect of bodily dynamization is the experience
of externalization, that is, feeling one’s body or parts of it
projected beyond one’s ego boundaries into the outer space. As
is the case with violation and distortion of body construction,
also externalization is not a static experience but it implies
movement. Ego and corporeal boundaries, so to say, are violated
from within by parts of the body that are felt as expelled into
the outer space. In this type of experience as well, parts of
one’s body are experienced as thing-like entities in an outer
space.
Thingness/Mechanization
The other characterizing feature of anomalous bodily experiences
is an uncanny morbid objectivization and devitalization of the
body or its parts. In morbid objectivization, parts of one’s body
that are usually silently and implicitly present and at work
become explicitly experienced. Typically, morbid objectivization
goes together with the experience of devitalization, that is, parts
of one’s body are felt as devoid of life and/or substituted by
some kind of mechanism. In general, the body or its parts
are experienced as mere things or, thing-like entities, rather
than as living flesh. Parts of oneself are spatialized—experienced
as if they were dis-integrated from the living totality of
one’s body. Persons with schizophrenia typically describe their
condition as that of a deanimated body (‘‘Heart no more there’’,
‘‘Brain into ashes’’, ‘‘Nerves as strings pulling me up’’), or a
disembodied mind (‘‘I am like fog on quagmire’’, ‘‘Just ethereal,
no body’’).
On the other hand, one may feel like a scanner or
disincarnated mind which lives as a mere spectator of one’s
own perceptions, actions, and thoughts. Acts of perception
themselves are no more experienced from within, but from
without, becoming objects of noetic awareness (‘‘It was as
if I could see my eyes watching the scene’’, ‘‘I was like a
receptor of stimuli’’). The self breaks down into an experiencing
I-subject contemplating an experienced I-object while the latter
is acting or perceiving (‘‘[My] eyes watching TV’’, ‘‘[My]
hand masturbating’’). The phenomenality of this experience is
no longer implicitly embedded in itself, that is, characterized
by a pre-reflective self-awareness. In other words, the act
of experiencing turns out to be an explicitly intelligible
object.
The intimate, pre-reflective (that is, implicit and operative)
awareness of my perceptions, actions, and thinking as my
own is replaced by a second-order noetic (that is, explicit
and conscious) awareness of something which perceives that
I am perceiving, acting or thinking: ‘‘I am the spectator of
my body split from the world’’, ‘‘One part of the brain talks
to the other’’, ‘‘The world is an illusion because it is seen
through a brain’’. Persons with schizophrenia often describe
their condition as that of a deanimated body (‘‘Heart no more
there’’, ‘‘Brain into ashes’’, ‘‘Nerves like strings pulling me up’’),
or a disembodied mind (‘‘[I am ] like fog on quagmire’’, ‘‘Just
ethereal, no body’’). On the face of it, such self-descriptions
may seem metaphorical, but they contain a bodily ‘‘organic
echo’’ which reveals how these persons are actually feeling
and experiencing. On the one hand, one’s existence feels like
that of a cyborg or a lifeless, purely mechanical body (‘‘[I
felt] like a puppet’’, ‘‘No emotions, just impulses’’, ‘‘[the body]
a mechanical engine’’, ‘‘I didn’’t move it [the body] . . . it
moved me’’).
Abnormal Experience of Lived Time
Schizophrenic persons typically describe their sense of temporal
reality as: ‘‘things to a standstill’’, ‘‘immobility, but not calm’’,
‘‘time going back to same moment over and over’’, ‘‘people
like statues’’, ‘‘frozen moment’’, ‘‘out of time’’, ‘‘marmoreal’’,
‘‘unreal stillness’’. Time is fragmented, there is a breakdown in
time Gestalt, and an itemization of now-moments. The mere
succession of conscious moments as such cannot establish the
experience of continuity. Another typical phenomenon is that a
revelation is on the verge to happen, the world is on the verge of
ending, a new world is coming, one’s own life is on the point
of undergoing a radical change. Time is ‘‘a state of suspense’’,
‘‘pregnant now’’, ‘‘being is hanging’’, ‘‘something imminent’’,
‘‘something . . . I didn’t know what . . . was going to happen . . .
between inspiration and expiration’’ (Stanghellini and Rosfort,
2013).
The main feature of abnormal time experience in
schizophrenia is Disarticulation—a breakdown of the synthesis
of past, present and future. Disarticulation of time experience
includes four subcategories.
Disruption of Time Flowing
Patients live time as fragmented. Past, present and future are
experienced as disarticulated. The intentional unification of
consciousness is disrupted. The presentmoment has no reference
to either past or future. The external world appears as a
series of snapshots. Typical sentence: ‘‘World like a series of
photographs’’.
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Déjà vu/Vecu
Patients experience places, people and situations as already seen
and the news as already heard. This abnormal time experience
entails a disarticulation of time structure as the past is no more
distinguishable from the present moment. The already-happened
prevails. Typical sentence: ‘‘When I heard news I felt I had heard
it before’’.
Premonitions About Oneself
Patients feel that something is going to happen to them or that
they are going to do something. This abnormal time experience
entails a disarticulation of time structure as the immediate future
intrudes into the present moment. The about-to-happen prevails.
Typical sentence: ‘‘I felt something good was going happen
to me’’.
Premonitions About the External World
Patients feel that something is going to happen in the external
world. As the previous one, this abnormal time experience
entails a disarticulation of time structure as the immediate future
intrudes into the present moment. The about-to-happen prevails.
Typical sentence: ‘‘Something is going on, as if some drama
unfolding’’ (Stanghellini et al., 2016).
Disintegration of TT as Core Disorder
We assume that the disintegration of time experience on the
phenomenal level reflects the disarticulation of TT on the
trans-phenomenal level. The manifold of the phenomenal
anomalies that we found in the life-world of persons
with schizophrenia—including anomalies of phenomenal
consciousness (e.g., disintegration of the appearance of external
objects and itemization of external world experience), selfhood
(e.g., disruption of the implicit sense of being a unified, bounded
and incarnated entity), and sociality (e.g., breakdown of one’s
sense of being naturally immersed in a meaningful flow of social
interactions with others; Stanghellini et al., 2016)—can be traced
back to a fundamental trans-phenomenal abnormality, namely
the disintegration of TT. We thus pursue the second step of our
top-down approach in schizophrenia, stepping down from the
contents of experience, e.g., body and time, to the underlying
temporal features, the trans-temporal features, that structure and
organize the contents and thus the background within which the
latter can be experienced.
We argue that the fragmentation of bodily experience taking
place on the phenomenal level is originated by a fragmentation
of TT—that is, of the pre-reflexive synthesis of impression-
retention-protention. The latter takes place on the trans-
phenomenal, non-experienced level and is closely related to
anomalies of the resting state, which in their own turn take place
on the pre-phenomenal level.
There are two features of bodily experience related to a
breakdown of TT. The first is that if TT breaks down, increased
heart rate, bodily tension, to impulse to flee away, blurred vision
due to midriasis will appear in one’s field of consciousness as
single items disconnected form each other, unrelated to one’s
own self. The second one is that they will also appear as unrelated
from their source in the outside world. TT is the condition of
possibility for coordinating intero- and proprioceptive feelings
between themselves, and with exteroceptive ones. This means
that TT is needed for experiencing these phenomena as belonging
to my own embodied and situated self as a spatiotemporal
entity.
Bodily feelings that are no longer embedded in one’s global
awareness of one’s own body (coenesthesia) are experienced as,
e.g., uncanny bodily sensations (coenesthopathies), automatic
movements, made impulses and actions, motor blockages,
etc. Coenesthesia (koiné aesthesis literally means the faculty
that brings together different senses) is the name for the
integration of the manifold of impressions coming from
one’s own body, including phenomena related intero- and
exteroceptive functions, like neurovegetative functions (e.g.,
increase in heart rate), emotions (e.g., bodily feelings of tension),
voluntary movements (e.g., fleeing), involuntary movements
(e.g., midriasis), etc.
The origin of these symptoms could be searched for at the
basic level where the temporal coherence of conscious awareness
is constituted. A failure of the constitutive temporal synthesis
may create micro-gaps of conscious experience. Feelings or
sensations that are no longer embedded in the continuity of
basic self-experience may appear in consciousness as ‘‘erratic
blocks’’ and experienced as being inserted, or externalized. This
is known in the clinic of schizophrenia as permeability of Ego
boundaries. This coheres with the hypothesis that a breakdown
of temporality may be bound up with the breakdown of pre-
reflexive self-awareness.
As to the second phenomenal feature, the disruption of TT
will make intero- and proprioceptive phenomena appear with
no connection with events and situations in the surrounding
world. For instance, disesthesic paroxisms when in stressful
situation will not recognized as the manifestations of a
stress reaction o an emotion elicited by the situation itself.
The coupling between bodily sensations and life situation
needs the integrity of TT as these are two moments in the
spatiotemporal self-world relation. If the continuity of temporal
experience disintegrates, overarching meaningful unification
of world- (e.g., threatening situation) and self-experience
(e.g., anxiety) is no longer available. The outcome is that
I may feel oppressed by uncanny and incomprehensible
bodily sensations evoked by interpersonal contact without me
being aware that they evoked by interpersonal contacts. All
this may lead to typical schizophrenic phenomena as full-
blown psychotic symptoms as for instance so-called bizarre
delusions.
Abnormal Temporal Structure of Brain’s
Spontaneous Activity and the Experience
of the Lived Body
Can we link these phenomenal features to the brain and its
spontaneous activity? Without going into detail, the empirical
findings show evidence for what we describe as ‘‘temporal
dysbalance’’ and ‘‘temporal fragmentation’’ in the spontaneous
activity during internally-directed processing (for details, see
Northoff, 2014b, 2015b). Briefly, EEG and fMRI findings
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 172
Northoff and Stanghellini Spatiotemporal Psychopathology of the Lived Body
indicate an abnormally shift towards slower and infraslow
frequency fluctuations in schizophrenia at the expense of higher
frequencies like gamma amounting to ‘‘temporal dysbalance’’
(Uhlhaas et al., 2006; Kikuchi et al., 2011; Moran and
Hong, 2011; Spencer, 2012; Ford et al., 2012; Uhlhaas and
Singer, 2012, 2013, 2015; Hanslmayr et al., 2013; Sun et al.,
2013a; Narayanan et al., 2014; Ranlund et al., 2014). In
addition to such temporal dysbalance between higher and lower
frequencies, one can also observe decreased coupling or linkage
between different frequencies, e.g., cross-frequency cocupling,
between lower and higher frequencies, in schizophrenia (Allen
et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2013a,b). This amount to what can
be described as ‘‘temporal fragmentation’’ in spontaneous
activity.
How now are the above described trans-temporal features
of the abnormal lived body experience in schizophrenia
related to the abnormal temporal structure in the brain’s
spontaneous activity? We described temporal fragmentation as
related to decreased cross-frequency coupling. Decreased cross-
frequency coupling means that the continuous interoceptive
body like the heart at every second is no longer linked to
and integrated with other stimuli from the body (and also
the environment) that do not fall within exactly the same
time range. In the healthy brain, even stimuli that occur
before or after the heartbeat can be linked and integrated
due to the coupling of different frequency, e.g., those related
to the heart and the ones related to other stimuli. This
is no longer possible once the different frequencies are no
longer coupled to each other. Both heart and other vegetative
stimuli are processed in a segregated way and no longer
integrated and linked to each other by the spontaneous
activity’s (lacking) temporal structure during its internally-
directed processing. They are consequently experienced in an
isolated way.
In addition to the various vegetative or interoceptive stimuli
among each other, they are also no longer properly integrated
and linked to exteroceptive stimuli from the environment
and proprioceptive stimuli. That in turn leads to segregation
between the different stimuli, extero- and interoceptive and
proprioceptive. On the experiential level this means that they
and their respective objects, world and body become segregated
or ‘‘itemized’’, as we say above. One consequently want to
hypothesize that the degree of itemization as subjectively
experienced is directly proportional to the degree of (lacking)
cross-frequency coupling (in exactly those frequencies that allow
for integrating the various interoceptive stimuli among each
other and with the extero- and proprioceptive stimuli): the
low the degree of cross-frequency coupling among the relevant
frequencies, the higher the degree of itemization of the body as
subjectively experienced.
Such segregated processing may then also lead to the
dynamization of body boundaries as described above. If
the various intero- and proprioceptive stimuli can no longer be
integrated anymore, the body boundaries can no longer be clearly
demarcated and distinguished from the environment. Due to lack
of intero- and proprioceptive integration, the body is no longer
determined as whole with clear-cut boundaries which thereby
become fragile and volatile, e.g., dynamic (see Figures 3A,B).
Finally, the above described temporal dysbalance with a
relative shift towards low frequencies at the expense of higher
frequencies may abnormally impair the processing of stimuli
in faster frequencies while stimuli in the lower range may
be processed abnormally strong. This means that low- and
high-frequency stimuli are processed in a dysbalanced way
by the brain’s spontaneous activity: high frequency stimuli
are no longer processed as strongly while low-frequency
stimuli are abnormally reinforced in their neural processing
by the spontaneous activity’s temporal dysbalance. In other
terms low- and high-frequency stimuli from the body (and
the environment) are somewhat segregated from each other.
This further reinforces the split or segregation of experience
into time-based units of experience, ‘‘experiential moments’’
FIGURE 3 | (A) Brain and body experience in schizophrenia. (B) Abnormal pre- and trans-phenomenal features in brain and body experience in schizophrenia.
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that are detached from each other without any global
awareness.
CONCLUSION: A SPATIOTEMPORAL
APPROACH TO BRAIN, EXPERIENCE AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Our article focused on the question how to link brain
and experience as in the title. The purpose was not to
transform a hypothesis into a law of nature with the alibi of
neuroimaging techniques (Markovà and Berrios, 2015). Rather,
we wanted to test a hypothesis providing converging data from
psychopathological evidence (phenomenal), phenomenological
contructs (trans-phenomenal) and neuroscientific measures
(pre-phenomenal). Rather than laws, we here target the resting
state’s capacities or predispositions (Northoff, 2013, 2015a,
Northoff and Heiss, 2015) to construct a spatiotemporal
structure with these capacities being abnormally altered in
schizophrenia. Hence, our hypothesis is about the resting state’s
capacity to construct a spatiotemporal structure for both intero-
and exteroceptive stimulus processing and integration rather
than to claim for imaging-based empirical generalizations, e.g.,
laws. The difference between laws and capacities lies mainly in
the fact that the realization of capacities is strongly context-
dependent with, more specifically, the brain’s spontaenous
activity being dependent upon its respective environmental,
e.g., socio-cultural and experiential, context (for instance, see
Nakao et al., 2013; Northoff, 2014b; Duncan et al., 2015).
This contrasts with the concept of laws whose instantiaton
and realization remains context-independent. For the reasons
of brevity, we could not go into detail about such socio-
cultural and experiential context-dependence of the brain’s
spontaneous activity and its spatiotemporal structure in this
article. However, as it is clear, it is highly relevant for
especilly psychosis and schizoprhenia where such socio-
cultural and experiential context-dependence has often been
observed.
We first attempted to sketched an appropriate methodological
approach, a spatiotemporal approach that combines and
integrates both bottom-up approaches from brain to experience
and top-down approaches from experience to brain. Specifically,
the bottom-up approach focuses on the brain and its spontaneous
activity’s internally-directed processing and how the latter
is characterized by spatiotemporal structure and their pre-
phenomenal nature as predisposing certain experiential, e.g.,
phenomenal features. In contrast, the top-down approach
starts with an analysis of subjective experience and reveals
its underlying spatiotemporal features, the trans-phenomenal
feature of temporality as we described it. In our tentative model,
bottom-up and top-down approach converge in spatiotemporal
features that allow for convergence the brain’s spontaneous
activity’s pre-phenomenal features and the experience’s trans-
phenomenal features.
Based on phenomenological research, the body in
schizophrenia is typically experienced in an itemized way
as an object external to one’s self. Based on neurobiological
data, we hypothesize that such itemization of the lived body is
related to decreased integration between intero-, extero- and
proprioceptive stimuli by the brain’s spontaneous activity and
its temporal structure during internally-directed processing.
Taken all together, this suggests that we view abnormalities
of bodily experience in terms of their underlying abnormal
spatiotemporal features which, as we suppose, can be traced
back to the spatiotemporal features of the brain’s spontaneous
activity. Such ‘‘Spatiotemporal Psychopathology’’ (see also
Northoff, 2015a,b) of the ‘‘lived body’’ may be developed further
in the future as well as applied to other phenomenal features like
experience of self, time, and space in schizophrenia and other
psychiatric disorders like depression.
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